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I. INTRODUCTION
Sovereign excesses in the twentieth century resulted in the murder of approximately
170,000,000 persons by their sovereign.1 This statistic, a potent testimony of sovereign
excesses through gross and systematic human rights violations firmly places human rights and
humanitarian problems on the international plane. This reality (identified and articulated in
the Report of the Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change)2
firmly places human rights problems on the international plane and mandates a fundamental
rethinking about the basis of sovereignty’s political and associational organization in the new
millennium.

Since the end of World War II, a body of international rights law has emerged that considers a
government’s treatment of its own citizens as a concern of international regulation instead of
internal State prerogatives.3 “It is therefore inevitable that States would regard egregious
violations of human rights as subject to individual criminal responsibility instead of only State
liability.”4 Lynn S. Bickley extrapolates and substantiates this point thus:
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Consistent with a sovereign responsibility to protect its citizens, the increasingly active role of the
international community in human rights protection enhances rather than diminishes the notion of
sovereignty. Although a nation sacrifices some sovereignty when it becomes a party to an
international agreement, it also gains certain protections that broaden and enhance its sovereignty. The
interdependence of the international community assists and fortifies sovereignty as the power of a
nation to protect its citizens.5

Distinguished international law publicists recognise what they regard as the “inescapability of
the concept of sovereignty as a quality of the State under present-day international law.”6
They also recognise it as a “fundamental principle of the law of nations.”7 However, even the
strongest proponents of this positivist view of international law conditioned by sovereign
States assert that international law strongly rejects the admissibility of absolute sovereignty as
the basic principle of international law.8

It follows then that rather than eliminating sovereignty as a political ideology, a more
productive enterprise would be to refocus the discourse away from the traditional structural
understanding of the term, which only serves to accentuate the level of discrepancy between
the theological and the political definitions of the term and which ultimately leaves the false
impression that absolute sovereignty is somehow realizable in the international political
sphere.9 This refocus would constitute a shift toward a functional conception of sovereignty,
wherein the purpose that State sovereignty would serve in any given situation would itself
determine its limits.10 This discursive shift in emphasis toward a functional understanding of
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sovereignty would facilitate recognition of sovereignty’s “neglected counter-side: sovereignty
is not only a claim of freedom from external interference, it is also the liberty to permit some
kinds of external interference.”11 Sammons reinforces this position with his observation that:

Since global interdependence creates a functional necessity for transnational cooperation, this
reformulation of sovereignty would suggest that in areas of law where the traditional Nation-State is
deemed ill-equipped to regulate, deference to global governance would paradoxically bolster that
state’s sovereignty. This reformulation would replace the misguided structural balance between the
empowering and limiting aspects of sovereignty, which posited international cooperation as a
tolerable concession, with a functional understanding of sovereignty strengthened by cooperation.12

Brian F. Havel further argues that sovereignty now “expresses a reanimated sense of
autonomy, it does so in the guise of a perfectly rational paradox: its existence also is defined
by its capacity to be given away.”13 He argues further that truly transnational concerns would
no longer simply be tolerated derogations of sovereignty; rather, they would become
emanations of that sovereignty.”14 In sum, “under this reformulation, sovereignty would no
longer exist in diametrical opposition to global denationalization.”15

No longer is State conduct immune from international scrutiny, or even from sanction.
Mechanisms are being created through which “sovereign” conduct is held accountable to
international norms—without the ability simply to claim lack of continuing consent to those
norms. This demonstrates that the nineteenth century notion of a second-tier social contract is
no longer appropriate to the conduct of international relations.16 International criminal law
runs directly to the individual.
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This Article has as its modest aim an examination and analysis of the role of the development
of human rights and humanitarian norms in reshaping the content and contour of Westphalian
sovereignty. In particular it seeks to espouse paradigms based on the impact of human rights
and humanitarian norms through which sovereignty should be viewed and understood in
contemporary times.

II. THE WORLD WARS: CHALLENGING WESTPHALIAN SOVEREIGNTY
World War I was a watershed conflagration. Apart from inaugurating total war, the end of the
war saw an unsuccessful attempt to prise open the iron curtain of Westphalian sovereignty by
individualising criminal responsibility for violations of the emerging law of war. The
punishment provisions of the peace treaties of Versailles and Sevres sought to limit the scope
of the principle of sovereign immunity by punishing military and civilian officials, while at
the same time extending universal jurisdiction to cover war crimes and crimes against
humanity.

In a dramatic break with the past, and in a bid to build a normative foundation of human
dignity, the chaos and destruction of World War I gave rise to a yearning for peace and a
popular backlash against impunity for atrocity. “The war provoked criticism by many of both
the outrageous behaviour by a government towards its own citizens (Turkey) and aggression
against other nations (Germany). Both types of atrocity evoked demands for increased respect
for humanity and the maintenance of peace.”17 The devastation of the war provided a catalyst
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for the first serious attempt to crack the Westphalian notion of sovereignty. This dramatic new
attitude was encapsulated in the enthusiasm for extending criminal jurisdiction over sovereign
States (Germany and Turkey) with the aim of apprehension, trial and punishment of
individuals guilty of committing atrocities through supranational trials.18

However the emerging commitment to human dignity was to be first derailed and then swept
aside by resurgent nationalistic ambitions brewed in the cauldron of sovereignty and distilled
by politics. The “iron curtain” of Westphalian sovereignty was the primary objection
advanced by both Germany and Turkey, against Allied calls for the establishment of
supranational tribunals to try the officials and personnel of these countries implicated in
wartime atrocities. Both nations in the light of these international efforts strongly advocated
against such a move arguing that sovereignty over territory and authority over nationals, a
sacrosanct principle of international law, was threatened if the proposed supranational
tribunals proceeded.

The anticipated international penal process yielded to the demands of national sovereignty
leading to sham national trials in Germany and Turkey after a major revision and scaling
down of the defendant list in both countries. While the envisaged international efforts to
secure international criminal liability failed to materialise, important principles were
established. Firstly, the 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and
on Enforcement of Penalties articulated crimes against humanity, and attempted to limit the
previously solid conception of sovereign immunity that shielded Heads of State as well as
officials from the reach of international law. Secondly, for the first time, the idea that the
State did not hold exclusive criminal jurisdiction was challenged. Lastly, the recognition of
18
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the need of international penal institutions to repress violations of international criminal law
in the face of State recalcitrance questioned the State’s exclusive right to legal competence
over management of its affairs.

Subsequently, the German and Turkish regimes that gained power in the post-war era
successfully relied on principles of national sovereignty to reject the authority of the
European Powers to intervene in the domestic trials held in lieu of anticipated supranational
trials. It was to take another round of State orchestrated carnage about two decades later to
spur States into giving international criminal law life and vitality. The resultant economic and
political chaos of World War II, reinforced by increasing moral disquiet over the idea that
States had a right to go to war whenever they wanted to provided the basis for focusing on
international accountability through penal process.

It was at Nuremberg (and later at Tokyo) that the iron curtain of sovereignty was dramatically
drawn back. The post-World War II trials were designed to change the anarchic context in
which nations and peoples of the world related to one another. The rejection of “obedience to
superior orders”, “acts of State” and “sovereign immunity” for the first time exposed the State
to inquiry into its freedom of action and law-makingcompetence.

The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials are the visible symbol of the transition from the classical
Westphalian system of State sovereignty to an international system based on the credo of
“common interest” that took place in the middle of the last century. In a sense these trials
represent the foundation of modern thinking about international law, with an emphasis on the
maintenance of peace and the responsibility of the State and its officials to international
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standards. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials of major war criminals were a landmark event in
the development of international law. Besides infusing international law with fundamental
moral principles in a manner not seen for centuries and giving birth to the modern
international law of human rights, the trials also gave clear notice to the nations of the world
that, henceforth, claims of absolute sovereignty must yield to the international community’s
claim on peace and justice.

Nuremberg and Tokyo marked a paradigmatic shift from the externalisation of domestic
norms under the statist Westphalian system of sovereignty to an international system
determined to increasingly internalise international norms within the national sphere. It was at
these post-World War II trials that unabashed claims of national sovereignty, stimulated by
the Nation-State system recognised at Westphalia, were subjected to the test of international
standards and universalist claims for peace and the sanctity of human rights. At Nuremberg
and later Tokyo, for the first time in history, individuals who had abused power in violation of
international law were held to answer in international courts of law for crimes committed
during war in the name of their State. The Nuremberg Judgment (echoed subsequently by the
Tokyo judgment) clearly brought crimes against humanity from the realm of vague
exhortation into the domain of positive international law spawning the idea that grave and
massive violations of human rights can become the concern of the international community,
not just that of the individual State.

The World after Nuremberg & Tokyo: Common Values, Common Interests
The decision by the Allies at the end of World War II to try major war criminals for violations
of international law was a turning point in modern history concerning the relationship
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between individuals and international law.19 The lesson of Nuremberg, echoed at Tokyo, was
that never again would atrocities in war or peace be carried out with impunity and that the
world was determined to bring to accountability individuals who carried out massive and
heinous atrocities against other warring parties and civilians. The Nuremberg tribunal was not
merely to establish plainly and forcefully that the rules of public international law should and
do apply to individuals; it was also intended to demonstrate that the protection of human
rights was too important a matter to be left entirely to States, a proposition that was earlier
enshrined in the Preamble and Article 55 of the UN Charter.20

The post-World War II trials were a pivotal event in international law. In some ways they
marked a return to venerable doctrines of natural justice that had fallen into disuse and
disfavour with the rise of legal positivism starting in the eighteenth century. Naturalistic
doctrines were resurrected and infused into the new thought and philosophy that was behind
the decision to hold the trials. The belief in natural law helped to ensure that the tribunals
would apply international law in the interests of fundamental moral values. This reversed the
nineteenth century trend—the heyday of legal positivism—during which natural law lost
much ground as positivism gained sway and infused international law with the agenda of
maximising State sovereignty and cutting back concerns with following any fundamental
precepts of morality.

The significance of the post-World War II trials is captured by Justice Robert H Jackson,
Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg. Writing in 1949, he described the Nuremberg international
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trials as the twentieth century’s most “definite challenge” to the “anarchic concepts of the law
of nations.”21 He argued that Nuremberg was the first step towards limiting the unfettered
discretion of sovereign States to resort to armed force.22 Government officials could no longer
credibly claim legal immunity based upon the act of State and superior orders defences.23
Jackson noted that international institutions were so undeveloped and moribund that, absent
the Nuremberg trial, it is unlikely that these “catastrophic doctrines” would have been
challenged and modified.24

Internationalisation of the Individual
The concept that international law should take into account the rights and duties of individuals
was not a position generally accepted as a part of international law immediately prior to the
post-World War II international trials. At that time, international law dealt with the rights and
duties of States and applied only to interactions and conflicts among States.25 There is,
however, evidence that individual rights were a concern of international law in the eighteenth
century,26 but this interest faded in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the statist concept
of international law driven by positivist doctrines gained popularity.

The post-World War II international trials revived the commitment to protect individual rights
infusing international law with naturalistic doctrines that had earlier been eclipsed. It was
primarily normative concerns that reintroduced and reinforced naturalistic doctrines into
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international law. Individuals suffered horribly at the hands of the Axis war machine, and the
Allies resolved to include serious violations of human dignity as crimes in the Tribunals’
jurisdiction. The international trials cast in stone the important principle that if individuals are
directly subject to international legal obligations, they are also directly entitled to
international legal rights. This principle was implied in the post-World War II international
trials in two ways. First, the victim had rights that international law could protect collectively
through criminal law. Second, in the same manner that the rights of individuals would
henceforth be a concern of international law, the conduct of individuals under the colour of
official State action would no longer be immune from the reach of international law. In
holding that individuals have obligations under international law which are over and above
the obligations to the sovereign States of Germany and Japan, the post-World War II
international trials pierced the Westphalian veil of sovereignty by directly challenging and
trumping the dictates of national law.

The message was clear; those who authorised and committed crimes against peace, war
crimes and other humanitarian crimes would be personally responsible for those crimes and
would be made to suffer the consequences of their conduct. To hold the perpetrators of these
proscribed forms of conduct accountable signifies that terrible things cannot be done to
people without a resulting meaningful international sense of responsibility. This infusion of
morals and concern for individual rights into international law launched the modern doctrine
of international human rights law.

By establishing individual accountability for violations of international law, the Nuremberg
and Tokyo judgments explicitly rejected the argument that State sovereignty was an
acceptable defence for unconscionable violations of international criminal law. The
10

previously conflicting demands of sovereignty and global order that crippled the post-World
War I attempts at international penal process were overcome by the viability of individual
accountability. Henceforth, citizens were firmly a concern of international regulation instead
of internal State prerogatives, and the State’s law-making competence in certain aspects was
to be limited by the requirements of international law.

Externalising the State and its Sovereignty
The post-World War II international trials impacted the State in two ways. Firstly, the right of
the State to act was challenged through the “crimes against humanity” and the “crimes against
peace” counts, alluding to a limitation in the law-making competence of the State. The crimes
against humanity count reached behind the iron curtain of Westphalian sovereignty and held
that individuals have international human rights which State action cannot jeopardise and that
State authorisation provides no cover for individuals who violate the human rights of others.
The violations committed by these individuals are punishable under international law. This
principle is the explicit recognition that a nation’s sovereignty is limited by the demands of
international law.

Secondly Nuremberg and Tokyo represented practical manifestations of the authority of the
international community under international law to question, assess and pass judgment on the
internal activities and laws of the State. In holding that the local municipal law of the
sovereign States of Germany and Japan provided no cover for individuals who had violated
international rules governing the conduct of warfare, the post-World War II international trials
upheld the notion that a State was bound by international law even when its government had
chosen not to be so bound.
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If we view the operational state of international criminal law as constitutionally allocated to
sovereign States by custom, practice and treaty law, then the post-World War II international
trials were an important constitutional allocation of competence to the international
community and away from the sovereign Nation-State. This is the accurate juridical position
which Nuremberg (and Tokyo) occupy in the global constitutive process. The Nuremburg
tribunal confronted the dualism between sovereign versus personal responsibility directly:
“[h]e who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the
authority of the State if the State in authorising action moves outside its competence under
international law.”27

Supranational Jurisdiction for International Law Violations
Universal jurisdiction allows any nation to prosecute offenders for certain crimes even when
the prosecuting nation lacks a traditional nexus with, either the crime, the alleged offender, or
the victim. This doctrine limits the reach of national sovereignty while extending the reach of
international law. Courts developed this doctrine centuries ago to address piracy and later
extended it to cover slave trading.28 The pirate and slave trader were deemed hostis generis
humanis—the enemy of all people. “Until the 1920s the practice of States, both with respect
to the power to prescribe and the power to enforce, preserved the connection between State
sovereignty in its territorial context and the judicial exercise of national criminal
jurisdiction.”29 The progressive trends in certain judicial opinions as well as legal writings in
the interwar period buoyed by post-World War I efforts at international criminal
accountability contributed in paving the way for the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to
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extend universal jurisdiction to cover several offences other than piracy and slave trading. The
doctrine was expanded to include crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against
humanity.

Until Nuremberg and Tokyo, it was only national courts that would prosecute criminals for
crimes committed in a particular country provided that there existed either a territorial or
nationality nexus. This concept was first by-passed at Nuremberg when it obliterated
traditional aspects of national sovereignty in its approach towards crimes against peace and
war crimes when it articulated for the first time the concept of crimes against humanity.

Universal jurisdiction together with the post-World War II international trials’ multilateral
recognition of international human rights extending beyond the borders of individual
countries pointed to the need for supranational judicial process to implement international law
particularly where leaders with immense military and political power are involved in
international law violations. Enforcement of international criminal law at the post-World War
II international trials was the first modern international adjudication of crimes extending
beyond the reach of a national sovereign in modern times.

The post-World War II international trials constituted an unprecedented inroad into the great
barrier of sovereignty—exclusive territorial and national jurisdiction—and set a lasting
precedent in relation to the extension of international criminal jurisdiction beyond national
frontiers. This was previously an impossibility in view of the iron curtain cast by the
Westphalian notion of sovereignty. The mantle of legal protection against the worst forms of
violent abuse was to be a central feature in the drive to clip State sovereignty, by subjecting
the State to external restraints and controls.
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III. THE COLD WAR: CHECKING THE ADVANCES IN CURTAILING
WESTPHALIAN SOVEREIGNTY?
The “internationalisation” of the legal status of the human being became one of the most
prominent features of the post-World War II period after the Nazi and fascist violations of
elementary human rights.30 From an international law perspective, the idea that individuals
could be directly responsible under international law subverted a cardinal tenet of the
positivist conception of international law—that it is a law of sovereign States for sovereign
States. The law of both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters and the manner in which the
judges applied it was in opposition to the general nationalistic, statist, and positivist
philosophies generally ascendant in the nineteenth to early twentieth century period. This
stance however had the positive effect of reinvigorating international law with revolutionary
principles—principles such as individual criminal responsibility and limitation of the
sovereign State’s law-making competence. These fundamental principles were a signal for the
future course of sovereignty vis-à-vis international law.

The post-World War II era was a period in which the freedom and independence of the State
in law-making was subjected to limitations by international law in respect of certain
international interests. What had been unthinkable before World War II became
commonplace. The dozens of human rights and humanitarian instruments adopted after the
post-World War II trials are based on the premise that sovereign States are not free to abuse
their own citizens with impunity. The instruments are designed to secure adherence to the
international human rights recognised at the post World War II international trials. Besides
demonstrating that legal values arising from international law impose obligations directly on
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the State, these instruments are a sign that the citizen is not subject only to the dictates of the
national sovereign but a subject of the dictates of international law as well.

Even as international human rights and humanitarian law instruments marked the important
steps by the international law to limit sovereignty, the Cold War was to tie the issue of
sovereignty to ideological and revolutionary agendas. The world experienced the third
struggle for hegemonic domination of the twentieth century hot on the heels of the conclusion
of the second. The USSR increasingly saw the notion of “restriction of sovereignty” and the
conceptions of “common interest” and “common good” as nothing more than a diplomatic
screen hiding the avaricious and predatory aims of Western imperialist Powers.31 Coupled
with this stance by one of the world’s only two superpowers was the outcome of the
decolonization and self-determination process which saw a radical increase in internationally
recognised claims to national State sovereignty. Vast numbers of newly independent
sovereign States were weak in terms of national integration and foreign relations. This led to
widespread reification of sovereignty in the vast numbers of newly independent States,
justified under the internal affairs domestic jurisdiction clause of the UN Charter.32 These
States sought to claim widespread immunity from international duties and obligations
(especially in the human rights sphere) and expanded sovereign rights as a form of
compensation for the wrongs of colonial-imperialist exploitation and hegemony. The net
effect of these factors was to strengthen sovereignty considerations as the UN became a
ground for cultivating the agenda of nationalism brought to the fore with the appearance of
the “Third World” as a force in the years after World War II.
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With sovereignty viewed as a vital element of global international society, the power politics
of the Cold War era served to curtail the expected benefits from the limitation of sovereignty
articulated at the post-World War II trials. Consequently, an increasingly evident
contradiction in the Cold War appeared. International law continued to pursue its original, and
still topical, ambition which is to regulate the relations between States in their international
dimensions while at the same time tending more and more to defer to the municipal
dimension of States and their domestic affairs. The interpenetration between international
dimensions and national aspects in inter-State relations, against a background of rivalries in a
divided world, was a feature of the Cold War that threatened to expand and strengthen State
sovereignty, which had undergone a major battering at Nuremberg and Tokyo.

The Cold War largely put an end to the spurt of international judicial activity inaugurated at
Nuremberg and Tokyo and contributed to the preservation of a statist international order.
Many States were reluctant to enthusiastically embrace any form of international penal
process and displayed a great deal of ambivalence in the normal conduct of their foreign
affairs. Though a series of conflicts in the Cold War era set the arena for violations of
international criminal law, the lack of a systematic international enforcement regime
contributed to the lack of respect for the legitimacy of the international justice and even to a
degree of cynicism about it. With lack of State cooperation, the blood-soaked Cold War era
was characterised by impunity. The ad hoc international criminal tribunals in the 1990s
represented an international effort to put in place an international enforcement regime, the
lack of which had helped ensure impunity during the Cold War era. The war crimes and
crimes against humanity counts at Nuremberg were the forerunners at the heart of the United
Nations Security resolutions of the 1990s which created the two ad hoc international criminal
tribunals.
16

IV. POST-COLD WAR: OLD SOVEREIGNTY, NEW SOVEREIGNTYINTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AS A TRANSITIONAL CRUCIBLE
The creation of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda raised questions concerning the appropriate relationship between these international
ad hoc penal institutions and national courts. This is in view of the fact that traditionally
sovereignty over territory and authority over nationals are two of the most basic aspects of
statehood, and therefore the territorial and nationality principles are more fundamental than
other competing principles of jurisdiction. While the statutes of the ad hoc international
criminal tribunals recognise that national courts have concurrent jurisdiction, they clearly
assert the primacy of the international tribunals, an extraordinary jurisdictional development.
Though States, by definition, have international independence, “combined with the right and
power of regulating [their] internal affairs without foreign dictation,”33 the weakening of its
denotation of full and unchallengeable power over territory and all the persons therein, is
illustrated by the establishment of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals. It was not
lost on the international community that concessions to the ideals of international justice were
necessary to create effective international mechanisms necessitating trumping the wishes of
many States insisting upon preserving the totality of their sovereign prerogatives.

The new balance achieved between the jurisdiction of national courts and that of the ad hoc
international criminal tribunals marks the end of an era when the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction fell within the unfettered prerogatives of the sovereign State. Though the Security
Council created each of the two existing international criminal tribunals ad hoc as an
extraordinary response to a specific and narrowly defined threat to international peace and
security, to enable them to address these threats, it granted them unprecedented primacy over
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the jurisdiction of all national courts. The practice and application of primacy, both in the
ICTFY and the ICTR, foreshadowed the political and legal disputes over the creation of a
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) and the possible contours of its jurisdiction
during the Rome Diplomatic Conference.

The dilemma of building agreement among State Parties without diluting core principles
essential to an effective international penal regime coloured the Rome conference.34 The
process of making the Rome Statute was a battleground for supra-national and inter-national
regimes. The challenge was the need for a trade-off between achieving consistency and
building consensus. This was arguably more pronounced in part because the State was being
called upon to reconfigure certain key aspects of its domestic jurisdiction as well as statecrafted inter-national regimes in favour of a functioning international regime.35 Consultations,
consensus and compromise were at the heart of the Statute making process.36

The Rome Statute embodies a carefully crafted compromise between a State-centred idea of
jurisdiction, and a more inclusive international vision. The State-centred idea, in its extreme
manifestation, would uphold a State’s exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute and try its own
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citizens for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, and to prosecute and try
citizens of other States who commit such acts on the territory of the forum State. An inclusive
vision would promote the idea of universal jurisdiction, whereby individuals of any
nationality could be tried for certain crimes by any State acting on behalf of humanity as a
whole. The ICC follows a middle path. The Rome Statute assigns primary jurisdiction to the
ICC’s Member States. However, in ratifying the Rome Statute and becoming members of the
ICC, States agree that, if they are unwilling or unable to carry out their obligation to
investigate and prosecute these crimes, the ICC has “complementary” jurisdiction to do so in
their stead.

The ICC will provide an indispensable backup to national jurisdictions in deterring,
investigating, and prosecuting serious international crimes. The momentum behind the ICC
testifies to the increasing realization by countries that international norms may require
international enforcement mechanisms, especially where individual perpetrators beyond the
reach of their own domestic courts are concerned. The frequent observation that an individual
who commits one murder may face life imprisonment, but another who murders thousands
may enjoy impunity, has driven efforts to rectify this incongruity, especially insofar as it
constitutes a by-product of an international system of sovereign States.37 The ICC will
provide important incentives and support for domestic efforts in future cases, and it will
eliminate the need to create additional ad hoc international tribunals when domestic legal
systems lack the will or ability to investigate and prosecute these crimes themselves.

37

Signing, ratifying, and implementing the ICC provides States with an opportunity to review their existing
criminal procedures, and to ensure that these comport with international standards such as those relating to due
process, the protection of victims and witnesses, and jurisdiction over internationally recognised crimes.
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In sum, some see the Court as a monster arguing that: “If allowed to stand—and to thrive and
grow, as its champions intend—this Court will sound the death knell for national sovereignty,
and for the freedoms associated with limited, constitutional government.”38 But there are
those on the extreme end who feel that sovereignty is an outmoded concept and should be
discarded, dismissing the whole notion of sovereignty as a false idea and suggesting that for
legal purposes, we might do well to relegate the term to the shelf of history as a relic from an
earlier era.39

Overall, the author contends that the continued relevance of sovereignty should be balanced
against reality. Though State sovereignty is still a cornerstone of international law it should
not be seen as the bulwark from which State prerogatives are defended from foreign
infringement, even when this “infringement” aims to secure the rights of individuals and
entities within the domestic sphere.40 World War II exposed the hazards inherent in an
international system founded upon absolute sovereignty.41 The lessons derived from limiting
sovereignty as seen in the UN response to human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda provided the impetus for the international community to establish the ICC to
prevent recurrence of such atrocities. Those sovereign rights forfeited through submission to
the jurisdiction of the ICC are regained by the protection it provides.42
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V. AN AGEING IDEOLOGY FACING A NEW, YOUTHFUL REALITY
Sovereignty has several basic difficulties—some of a conceptual and some of an empirical
nature. From a conceptual point of view, the term has contradictory characteristics of being
both reified and porous.43 All too often though, the sovereignty doctrine is an “impenetrably
rigid juridical artefact as States incant the ritual of brooking no interference with their internal
affairs.”44 The constitutional position of the extant ad hoc international criminal tribunals as
well as the international criminal court is instructive. The common interest of sovereign
entities is better protected when exclusive parochial interests of reified sovereignty are
bypassed in the interests of mankind. The basis for this is through mapping and locating
sovereignty more precisely within the context of global power and constitutive processes.
Professor Nagan postulates that:

To strengthen the conceptual and doctrinal basis of humanitarian law we must purge the sovereignty
precept of the conceptual and normative confusion it generates. We need more precision about the
nature of the specific problems in which sovereignty is invoked as a sword or a shield, a clearer
perception of the common and special interest it sometimes seeks to promote, protect or compromise,
and a clearer delineation of its precise role in the constitutional order and promise of the UN Charter.
We must map and locate sovereignty more precisely within the context of global power and
constitutive processes.45

Since the end of the Cold War, international law has come to recognise the permissibility of
intervention in circumstances other than in response to a nation’s external acts of aggression.
This growth has focused primarily on the violation of basic human rights norms as a basis for
intervention. Current consensus indicates that a State’s violation of its citizens’ most basic
rights may permit intervention into its affairs. Indeed, “international law today recognises, as
a matter of practice, the legitimacy of collective forcible humanitarian intervention, that is, of

Court is mainly the result of some officials’ concerns about being prosecuted for their actions that threaten their
subject’s security).
43
Operational constitutions often exhibit the characteristics of being reified and porous at the same time.
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military measures authorised by the Security Council for the purpose of remedying serious
human rights violations.”46

State sovereignty, which for centuries was conceptualised as “the absolute power of the State
to rule,”47 has become delimited by recognition that the State may be responsible for its
breach of certain international obligations. Among these obligations, a State must provide for
the general safety of the human person and may not permit widespread human rights
violations against its citizens, such as the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity,
slavery, and apartheid.48 Though State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility are
separate concepts under international law,49 a State that undertakes the prosecution of a
foreign citizen for crimes committed in a foreign State assumes that State’s domestic
jurisdiction. In this regard, the author concurs with Anthony Sammons postulation that:

…the valid assertion of universal jurisdiction as the sole basis for the prosecution of international
crimes requires a conclusion that the State of the perpetrator’s nationality, or of the crime’s
commission, either has breached or failed to enforce its international obligations to such a degree that
partial assumption of its domestic jurisdiction is permissible.50

Sammons postulation is especially relevant in view of the fact that classical Westphalian
sovereignty hinders the development of a more rational approach to the international,
constitutional allocation of competence in controlling and regulating criminal behaviour that
requires effective international community intervention. Further elaboration of Sammon’s
view is encapsulated in Professor Nagan’s concise observation that:
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From an operational perspective, the practical question generally has been how far a State may go in
establishing the external reach of its criminal jurisdiction under international law. The phrase “under
international law” suggests some accommodating prudential limit of the reach of a state’s competence
from the perspective of other States whose interest may be compromised when a State allocates for
itself the right to try the nationals of other States under its own criminal justice standards.51

The destructive impact of massive and systematic human rights violations impinges directly
on important world order values which no State has dared suggest are not common and
shared. If human rights are considered serious values and matters of international concern,
then effective policing is required from local to global levels in the name of the world
community as a whole.52 A complete denial of the principles of human rights and
humanitarian law, especially when grave breaches of that law are involved represents a
rejection of fundamental human rights precepts and may point to an alternative normative
order that essentially disparages the precept of human dignity.

Professor Harold Laski notes that, “[s]overeignty, in the sense of an ultimate territorial organ
which knows no superior, was to the middle ages an unthinkable thing.”53 The “oneness” of
humanity was to be found through the pervasive unity of God (jus divinum) in the Respublica
Christiana.54 Like Hobbes’ later focus on the delegation of individual authority to the State,
medieval notions of sovereign power included limitations—based on abstract moral rights.55
Thus, there were bounds beyond which the sovereign could not pass in its relations with the
individual, and individual rights which were not alienable to the sovereign. The replacement
of the Respublica Christiana by the State meant that the significance of nationality became
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paramount. The protection and welfare of the citizenry was entrusted to the State.56 With the
dawn of international human rights, the State’s treatment of its citizenry was specifically
constrained through international law.

Though sovereignty in the external or international context continues to be strong, it is not as
absolute as its definition suggests.57 No State, however powerful, has been able to shield its
affairs completely from external influence.58 “Although sovereignty continues to be a
controlling force affecting international relations, the powers, immunities and privileges it
carries have been subject to increased limitations.”59 These limitations often result from the
need to balance the recognised rights of sovereign nations against the greater need for
international justice.60

Since one of the main roles of a sovereign State is to provide security and protection for its
own people,61 the author argues that a State forfeits its sovereignty when its actions are
universally condemned.62 From a legal perspective, each instance of enforcement serves to
legitimise norms of international criminal law. These norms reflect a collective judgment by
all countries that certain acts are by their very nature criminal. The enforcement of criminal
56
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law is innately tied to a nation’s sovereignty and it can be argued that by enforcing
international criminal law governments are not ceding sovereignty but instead are exercising
sovereignty.

… if the role of the sovereign is to provide security for its subjects, and effective means present
themselves for increasing security through international law, then the role of the sovereign must be to
participate in the development of that law. It is not an abdication of sovereign authority to delegate
functions and authority to a global system of law; it is in many cases an abdication of that authority
not to do so.63

When governments exercise their sovereignty by recognising and enforcing international
criminal law they reinforce and bolster a universal standard of international criminal law. This
may prove a difficult adjustment for political processes still entrenched in dual social contract
relationships of yester centuries but developments of the twentieth century properly
recognised emerging new trends in an understanding and location of sovereignty. This
understanding of sovereignty rejects approaching relations between sovereigns in terms of a
Lockean, second-tier social contract.64 This two-tiered notion of sovereignty treats the
relationship among States in forming the international order as parallel to the relationship
among citizens in forming the order that is the State. In this way, it obscures important aspects
of the relationship between the citizen and the State, and obstructs the proper functioning of
that relationship on the international plane.

The internationalisation of the individual in the aftermath of World War II and his/her
elevation from the subordinate status of an object of international law to a subject means that
62
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international law fractured the second-tier social contract structure by bringing first-tier social
contract subjects directly into second-tier relationships and thus effectively placing the
individual within the international legal framework.65 If international law is to be
contemporary in the twenty-first century, it must acknowledge the principal social contract
focus on the relationship between the citizen and the State for purposes of defining
sovereignty in both national (internal) and international (external) relations. In place of a
social contract of States, this redefinition of sovereignty recognises that international law has
developed direct links between the individual and international law. Consequently, an active
role on the part of the international community in promoting human rights and humanitarian
norms is consistent with a sovereign’s responsibility to protect its people, and enhances rather
than detracts from this notion of sovereignty.66 Patricia A. McKeon notes that:

Although a nation cedes some sovereignty when it becomes a party to an international agreement, it
also receives certain protections which broaden its sovereignty. If sovereignty is viewed as the power
of a nation to protect its citizens, as it should, fortifying itself with the aid of the international
community only enhances this objective.67

McKeon’s observation is echoed and amplified by the Report of the Secretary General’s
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The Report firstly endorses the
emerging norm of a responsibility to protect civilians from large-scale violence—a
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responsibility that is held, first and foremost, by national authorities.68 It however, goes on to
note that:

When a State fails to protect its civilians, the international community then has a further responsibility
to act, through humanitarian operations, monitoring missions and diplomatic pressure—and with force
if necessary, though only as a last resort. And in the case of conflict or the use of force, this also
implies a clear international commitment to rebuilding shattered societies.69

Support for the Report is found in the reality that the UN Charter is part of a world
constitutional instrument and hence the formal basis of an international rule of law. One of the
Charter’s primary purposes is to constrain sovereign behaviours inconsistent with its key
precepts. Professor Nagan notes that: “The term ‘sovereignty’ in the UN Charter is most
visible in the context of sovereign equality.”70 However he goes on to observe that: “Outside
this context, the term is rarely used in the text of the Charter. Indeed, Charter Article 2(7) uses
the term ‘domestic jurisdiction’ as a precept that seems intentionally less inclusive than the
term ‘sovereign’ suggests.”71 This particular interpretation provides the basis for the author to
contend that it seeks to demonstrate de-linkage of the external nature of sovereignty from its
internal contours and thus shed the all-encompassing conception that is frequently and
regularly attributed to Wesphalian sovereignty. “Commentaries that disregard State
sovereignty as an eradicable hindrance to denationalization fail to recognise the possible
benefits to be gained by simply redrawing the balance between sovereignty’s empowering and
limiting aspects.”72
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Recent international legal theory supports the view of sovereignty as an “allocation of
decision-making authority between national and international legal regimes.”73 A State’s total
“bundle” of sovereign rights remains extensive, as sovereignty remains the pre-emptive
international norm. However, the international legal regime obligates all States to maintain a
minimum standard of observation of human rights. By the existence of this minimum
standard, international law imposes obligations which a State must meet continuously in order
to maintain legitimacy under the international system. Elaborating on this new sovereignty
reconceptualisation, Kurt Mills asserts that:

[A State’s] rights and obligations come into play when a State, or at least certain actions of a State,
has been found to be illegitimate within the framework of the New Sovereignty. That is, when a State
violates human rights or cannot meet its obligations vis-à-vis its citizens, those citizens have a right to
ask for and receive assistance and the international community has a right and obligation to respond in
a manner most befitting the particular situation, which may involve ignoring the sovereignty of the
State in favour [sic] of the sovereignty of individuals and groups.74

The import of the assertion above is that when a State instigates or acquiesces in the
commission of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian norms, it
exceeds its allocation of authority as a matter of law. This position recognises that a State’s
sovereign rights with regard to the internal treatment of its population are not absolute and, by
implication, States are subject to international oversight. International law places conditions
on a State’s sovereign right to non-interference to the extent the State must meet its human
rights obligations or face intervention or trial of its nationals by foreign tribunals.75

The recognition of sovereignty as a bounded legal norm leads to the further conclusion that
sovereignty is not static within a nation, but is transferable. Sovereignty is dynamic and fluid,
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flowing at times from one country to another by some event of political restructuring within
the international community of States. If sovereignty can pass from one State to another, it
conceivably can flow from a State to the international community, or vice versa. When a
State exceeds its authority through commission of human rights violations, the State cedes its
sovereign right to non-interference.76 It cannot exclude other States acting collectively on
behalf of the international community.77 The future development of international law, which
includes an international criminal court hinges upon the continuing evolution of this
rationale.78 Whatever sovereign rights are forfeited by submitting to the jurisdiction of
international penal process are regained by the protection it provides.79 Thus, the evolution of
sovereignty and the increasing need for international justice have now converged.

VI. CONCLUSION
It is incontrovertible that the traditional Westphalian notions of the independent State and
sovereignty have changed irrevocably particularly in the course of the twentieth century. The
traditional notion of national sovereignty has been eroded to a large extent through the
development of the concept of international penal process. The international community
throughout the twentieth century has grappled with the problem that national sovereignty
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poses for mankind in the quest for a better world in which peace and the respect for human
rights reigns. Unabashed claims of national sovereignty, stimulated by the Nation-State
system recognised at Westphalia, have gradually been modified by universalist claims for
peace and respect for human rights through limitations on the State’s use of its power and
law-making competence.

Although hardcore realists still cling to the notion that States are supreme, reality points to the
fact that international law norms have developed rules whose aim is to modulate the
behaviour of States. This implies violation of, or intrusion upon State authority. International
penal process has already significantly contributed to a diminution of the overall concept of
sovereignty. The significance of international penal process and its accompanying tenet of
international justice reflects an evolution in the perception of sovereignty heralding a
qualitative shift from State supremacy to an ethical vision in which human values ultimately
prevail over State rights where the two are in conflict.

Although the State has expanded its capabilities for control and involvement in some areas,
overall the trend in international criminal law has been toward the ‘diminution of State
authority’ with authority being relocated both upward to international penal institutions and
downward as individuals and groups assert themselves as subjects of international law. The
international penal process represents a shift in authority from States to the international
community. Sovereignty has been chipped away, both from the outside and from within, as
the concept of an international penal process has been increasingly recognised as trumping the
right of States to hold sole rights in the exercise of certain prerogatives. We can conceive of
any reconceptualisation of sovereignty as moving both downward (inward) from the State
incorporating both human and ‘peoples’ rights and upward (outward) from the State as we
30

look for ways to respond to the need to protect these rights within a global framework as well
as respond to the increasing permeability of borders. International criminal law norms have
been thoroughly internationalised. But the internationalisation of norms does not necessarily
entail the internationalisation of implementation procedures.

Although the international obligations of States are normatively strong, implementation and
observance has been extremely weak necessitating the need for a permanent international
penal institution. An international penal process in opposition to the Stateis the enemy of
State power. The notion of international justice now points towards a sphere that, though
controlled by States, is ineffaceably external to power. The far-reaching transformation of the
social and political landscape in the last century has been accompanied by a correlative
transformation of the concept and practice of sovereignty through the development of an
international penal process.

State sovereignty cannot be written off simply by a documentation of the gains of
international penal process. Though it remains very much alive, much satisfaction is derived
from the fact that its content has changed and continues to change. Much dissatisfaction,
however, persists in the fact that few States ascribe fully and enthusiastically to the gains of
international justice. Much work still remains in convincing States that the necessary
concessions needed in order to have an efficient system of international justice are the only
way in which the gains spawned by international penal process can be both safeguarded and
utilised. Whether or not the power structure of Nation-States ever accurately reflected
textbook characteristics, sovereignty is subject to a greater range of qualifications. The
exclusivity and inviolability of State sovereignty are mocked by increasing percolation of
international norms and processes into the domestic sphere. Eliminating sovereignty from the
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lexicon of international relations in the foreseeable future is unlikely; State-centric structures
will not agree easily to part with the basis for their status quo. But it seems likely that the
trend to greater qualifications on the scope of sovereign authority is irreversible.
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